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Abstract 
 
The paper conducts a critical analysis of the potential legal basis and scope of the future 
European Union (EU)-Ukraine enhanced agreement. Accepting that the most probable 
and most beneficial possibility for Ukraine is to conclude an association agreement with 
the EU on the basis of Article 310 EC Treaty (EC), it is argued that the objectives of the 
enhanced co-operation between the EU and Ukraine - as expected and desired by the 
Ukrainian political élite - could be achieved by a partnership agreement concluded on 
the basis of Article 181a EC. Furthermore, if the new enhanced EU-Ukraine agreement 
were concluded as a partnership agreement, it might be better suited for the solving of 
certain political and legal challenges in contemporary EU-Ukraine relations. First, a 
new enhanced agreement concluded on the basis of Article 181a EC would not entail 
unjustified political expectations - on the part of Ukraine - of obtaining the perspective 
of full EU-membership in the near future. Second, a future EU-Ukraine partnership 
agreement would be the best option for a “transitional” enhanced agreement before the 
Treaty of Lisbon enters into force. Third, a future partnership agreement between the 
EU and Ukraine will not undermine the fundamentals of the evolving strategic 
partnership between the EU and Russia. 
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Contemporary discussion on the legal basis and scope of the new EU-Ukraine 
Enhanced Agreement 
The scope of the future EU-Ukraine enhanced agreement is one of the most 
debated topics among academics and practitioners. This is because the agreement will 
be the first among the new generation of the enhanced agreements negotiated by the EU 
and third countries under the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 
Consequently, it will, to a certain extent, serve as a template and a point of reference for 
other future enhanced agreements to be concluded between the EU and other neighbour 
countries which participate in the ENP.1 To date, the most outstanding contribution to 
the discussion on the potential scope of the EU-Ukraine enhanced agreement has been 
offered by Prof. C. Hillion of the University of Leiden.2 In his work, Hillion provides a 
comprehensive overview of the possible scope of the future EU-Ukraine enhanced 
agreement. In particular, he argues that the future EU-Ukraine enhanced agreement will 
pursue the objectives of setting up a comprehensive and deep free-trade area between 
the EU and Ukraine, enhanced multi-faceted co-operation (in various fields, such as 
energy, the environment, and transport and education) with emphasis on cross-pillar 
dimensions, and it will be a reciprocally-binding document. Most importantly, Hillion 
argues that the future EU-Ukraine enhanced agreement will be an association agreement 
based upon Article 310 EC, which is “potentially close although not necessarily exactly 
                                                
* The paper is based upon the report given at the Conference on the European Neighbourhood Policy and 
Ukraine at the University of Regensburg (Germany) in June 2007. The author is indebted to Prof. C. 
Hillion and Prof. M. Cremona for their comments on the earlier draft of this paper. 
1 The Council stated that “certain aspects of which [an Enhanced Agreement with Ukraine] could serve as 
model for other ENP partners in the future”. Press Release of the General Affairs and External Relations 
Council meeting on 18 June 2007 (10657/07 (Presse 138)). 
2 C. Hillion, ‘Mapping-Out the New Contractual Relations between the European Union and Its 
Neighbours: Learning from the EU–Ukraine ‘Enhanced Agreement’, (2007) 12 EFA Rev, pp. 169-182. 
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similar to the Europe Agreements (EA)3 or the Stabilisation and Association 
Agreements (SAA)4 with the Western Balkan countries”. The author draws his 
conclusions from “the terminology of several ENP documents” and “the inherent logic 
of the Neighbourhood Policy”. Most importantly, he states that “any agreement below 
association would not be perceived as an enhanced contractual relationship” for two 
reasons. First, because of the outdated character of the Partnership and Co-operation 
Agreements (PCA)5 and the “availability” of the association agreement after the Central 
and Eastern European (CEE) countries had joined the EU in 2005-2007. Second, 
because of the fact that the southern neighbour countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Marocco, the Palestine Authority (Interim Association Agreement), and 
Tunisia) have already signed association agreements with the EU. As a result, Hillion 
comes to the conclusion that “the new EU-Ukraine Treaty will almost inexorably be an 
association agreement based upon Article 310 EC, [and that] its likely cross-pillar 
dimension, both in terms of objectives and content, may mean that the Union could 
become a concluding party to the new agreement, alongside the Community and the 
Member States”. In his opinion, in order to fulfil the far-reaching objectives of this 
enhanced co-operation, the new EU-Ukraine enhanced agreement will be characterised 
by an active and influential framework (common institutions with the competence to 
issue binding-decisions). At the same time, the author believes that the new EU-Ukraine 
association agreement will contain a conditionality clause, and will, therefore, require 
constant monitoring on the part of the EU. 
One should conclude that the opinions expressed by Hillion are justified and 
likely to happen. Moreover, this scenario is both welcomed and desired by the 
Ukrainian government. Representatives of the Ukrainian government have frequently 
emphasised that their objective is to negotiate and to sign an agreement which envisages 
“political association and deep economic integration (a free-trade area)”.6 The 
Parliament of Ukraine (Verkhovna Rada) issued a statement calling the EU to allow the 
step-by-step perspective for Ukraine to acquire full EU-membership and to grant 
                                                
3 The EAs concluded with the following CEE countries: Poland (O.J. 1993 L 348/2, in force since 1 
February 1994), Hungary (O.J. 1993 L 347/2, in force since 1 February 1994), the Czech Republic (O.J. 
1994 L 360/2, in force since 1 February 1995), the Slovak Republic (O.J. 1994 L 359/2, in force since 1 
February 1995), Romania (O.J. 1994 L 357/2, in force since 1 February 1995), Bulgaria (O.J. 1994 L 
358/3, in force since 1 February 1995), Lithuania (O.J. 1998 L 51/3, in force since 1 January 1998), 
Latvia (O.J. 1998 L 26/3, in force since 1 January 1998), Estonia (O.J. 1998 L 68/3, in force since 1 
January 1998), and Slovenia (O.J. 1999 L 51/3, in force since 1 February 1999). 
4 At the moment of writing, the SAAs have been concluded with the FYROM (COM (2001) 90 final) and 
Croatia (COM (2001) 371 final) and Albania (COM (2006) 8164). The FYROM and Croatia SAAs 
entered into force on 3 May 2001 and on 12 December 2001 respectively. The Albania SAA is not 
ratified yet. The EU has launched negotiations on new SAA with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro 
and Serbia. 
5 EC-Russia PCA (OJ 1997 L 327), entered in force 1 December 1997; EC-Ukraine PCA (O.J. 1998, L 
49), entered in force 1 March 1998; EC-Moldova PCA (O.J. 1998, L 181), entered in force 1 July 1999; 
EC-Armenia PCA (O.J. 1999, L 239), entered in force 1 July 1999; EC-Azerbaijan PCA (O.J. 1999, L. 
246), entered in force 1 July 1999; EC- Georgia PCA (O.J. 1999, L 205), entered in force 1 July 1999; 
EC-Republic of Kazakhstan PCA (O.J. 1999, L 196), entered in force 1 July 1999; EC-Kyrgyz Republic 
PCA (O.J. 1999, L 196), entered in force 1 July 1999; EC-Uzbekistan PCA (O.J. 1999, L 229), entered in 
force 1 July 1999; EC-Republic of Belarus PCA (COM (95)137 final), signed in 1995, but in 1996 EU-
Belarus relations were stalled following political setbacks; EC-Turkmenistan PCA (COM (97) 693 final). 
6 See interview of the Prime-Minister Viktor Yanukovich on 08.02.2007, at:  <www.liga.kiev.ua>, 20 
April 2008. 
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considerable access for Ukrainian undertakings and nationals to the European Internal 
Market. Furthermore, the Verkhovna Rada called for the new enhanced agreement with 
the EU to be an “ambitious document” which will allow EU-Ukraine relations to be 
transformed from a partnership to a “political association and deep economic 
integration….in line with the contractual practice the EU has applied towards the CEE 
countries”.7 
At the same time, one must emphasise that neither the EU institutions nor the top 
EU officials have ever publicly confirmed that the future EU-Ukraine enhanced 
agreement will be negotiated as an association agreement based upon Article 310 EC. 
For example, the Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood 
Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, has never referred to the future EU-Ukraine agreement 
as an association agreement, but did explicitly mention, in the context of the future 
agreement, that “we can build strong relations, strong partnership [emphasis added] 
with our Ukrainian partners”.8 Following meetings with representatives of the EU (J. 
Solana, the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)), 
the Ukrainian President, V. Yuschenko, has somehow placated pro-association 
aspirations in Ukraine, and stated that it is “not the title of the future enhanced 
agreement that matters, but its substance”.9 Soon after, this formula was echoed by other 
Ukrainian governmental officials, including the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
At the XI EU-Ukraine Summit on 14 September 2007, the parties “reiterated their 
vision of the agreement as an innovative and ambitious document which goes beyond 
the established framework of co-operation and opens a new stage in EU-Ukraine 
relations”, without explicitly referring to the future agreement as an association 
agreement.10 
Therefore, accepting that the objectives and the scope of the new EU-Ukraine 
enhanced agreement proposed by Hillion offer the most likely scenario and the best 
options which comply with the objectives of the Ukrainian policy towards the EU, one 
can wonder if there are any other options for the legal base of the new EU-Ukraine 
enhanced agreement other than an association agreement based upon Article 310 EC? In 
other words, may the substance desired by the EU and Ukraine from the new enhanced 
agreement be achieved by other forms of agreement than an association agreement? 
Overview of the EU-Ukraine contractual relations 
Before answering the major questions of this paper, it is necessary to give an overview 
of the legal and political foundations of today’s bilateral co-operation between the EU 
and Ukraine. Hitherto, the apex of the legal framework which governs EU-Ukraine 
relations is occupied by the PCA. This agreement was signed by the EC and its Member 
States and Ukraine on 16 of June 1994, and entered into force on 1 March 1998.11 As an 
international agreement between the EC Member States on the one side, and Ukraine on 
                                                
7 Postanovlenie (Statement) of the Verkhovna Rada No 684-V “About the launching of negotiations 
between Ukraine and the EU on new fundamental agreement” on 22.02.07. 
8 Statement at the meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine A. Yatsenyk on 26 March 26 
2007 in Brussels, at: www.liga.kiev.ua, 20 April 2008. 
9 Statement at the meeting of President V. Yuschenko with J. Solana on 8 March 2007 in Brussels, at: 
www.liga.kiev.ua, 20 April 2008. 
10 Joint Statement of the XI EU-Ukraine Summit, 12927/07 (Presse 199). 
11 The similar PCAs were signed with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus (did not enter into force), Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Russia, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan (have not entered into force yet). 
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the other, the PCA is a binding document and constitutes an integral part of both the EC 
and Member States legal systems.12 In the Ukrainian legal system, the PCA, which is a 
ratified international agreement, has a binding effect and consequently enjoys priority 
over any conflicting national legislation, though it does not override the Constitution of 
Ukraine. Thus, in cases of conflict, the Ukrainian constitutional provision either prevails 
or has to be amended.13 
Within the system of EU external agreements, the PCAs, which were concluded 
with almost all former Soviet republics (the Newly Independent States (NIS)),14 
constitute a separate group of “partnership” agreements among “association”, “co-
operation”, “stabilisation” and “development” agreements entered into by the EC.15 The 
EC-Ukraine PCA, as other PCAs, could be classified as an “entry-level” agreement that 
does not envisage membership, but endorses the potential interest in developing further 
mutual co-operation between the parties. The PCAs are mixed agreements based upon 
Articles 133 and 308 of the EC Treaty, along with Articles 44(2), 47(2), 57(2), 71, 80 
EC Treaty. The EC exclusive competence covers PCA provisions on trade in goods and 
services including the cross-border supply of services. A number of specific bilateral 
agreements are concluded on the basis of exclusive EC competence.16 However, the 
PCAs do go beyond the EC framework and have a clear EU cross-pillar dimension. This 
means that the institutional framework of the PCAs does inter-penetrate with the 
remaining EU’s pillars: CFSP, and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).17 
In general, the PCAs are the external EU agreements which are mainly aimed at 
the establishment of a political dialogue, the facilitation of economic relations between 
the NIS countries and the EU Member States, the promotion of democratic reforms in 
Ukraine, the protection of human rights, and the establishment of a legal order that 
guarantees the rule of law. The preambles of the PCAs intentionally omit any reference 
to “the process of European integration” or “the objective of membership in the EU” as 
this is provided in the EU association agreements.18 The PCAs are aimed solely at the 
development of close political relations, the promotion of trade, investment and 
harmonious economic relations between the parties, and at sustaining mutually 
advantageous co-operation and support of a PCA country’s efforts to complete its 
transition into a market economy.19 Thus, the PCAs could be seen as a quite successful 
formula in the external EU policy. For the time-being, it certainly serves its purpose as a 
reliable legal instrument in sustaining long-term relations with the NIS countries, while 
                                                
12 For the acknowledgement by the ECJ of international agreements as a part of the EC legal system, see 
Case 104/81, Hauptzollamt Mainz v. Kupferberg, [1982] ECR 3641, para 13. 
13 Article 9 of the Ukrainian Constitution provides that “international treaties that are in force, agreed to 
be binding by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, are part of the national legislation of Ukraine. The 
conclusion of international treaties that contravene the Constitution of Ukraine is possible only after 
introducing relevant amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine”. 
14 Supra note 5. 
15 For a concise classification of the EC external agreements, see D. McGoldrick, International Relations 
Law of the European Union, (London, Longman, 1997), pp. 116-137. 
16 For example, agreements with the Ukraine on trade in certain steel and textile products (O.J. 2007, L 
178; O.J. 2007, L17). 
17 C. Hillion, ‘Institutional Aspects of the Partnership Between the European Union and the Newly 
Independent States of the Former Soviet Union: Case Studies of Russia and Ukraine’, (2000) 37 CML 
Rev., pp. 1211-1235. 
18 For example, the Preamble of the EU-Hungary EA. 
19 Article 1 of the EU-Ukraine PCA. 
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holding them at a controllable distance from closer access to the European Internal 
Market.20 
The evolution of the relations between the EU and the NIS countries implies the 
emergence of the new tools of the EU external policy initiatives which directly 
influence the pace of the economic, legal and political reforms in the NIS countries: 1) 
Common Strategies (CS);21 and 2) the ENP. In contrast to the more or less 
homogeneous PCAs, the CSs clearly differentiated the EU’s policy towards certain NIS 
countries, in accordance with geopolitical and geographic factors, economic progress, 
and further engagement in cross-border co-operation. Moreover, the CSs provided 
revisited and refined guidelines of mutual co-operation, including the approximation 
efforts between EU and NIS countries. Up to now, the European Council has endorsed 
only three CSs with Russia,22 Ukraine,23 and the Mediterranean,24 which share a common 
border with the EU. The CS towards Russia have focused mainly on consolidating 
democracy, the rule of law and public institutions, as well as on strengthening stability 
and security in Europe. In response to Ukraine’s reiterated diplomatic calls for a new 
framework agreement, the CS merely acknowledges and welcomes Ukraine’s European 
aspirations, and establishes its major objective of working with Ukraine in order to 
facilitate its further rapprochement with the EU.25 The CS towards Ukraine prioritised 
the support for the democratic and economic transition in Ukraine, including the 
progressive approximation of national legislation,26 and foresaw the possibility of 
studying the circumstances of the establishment of a free-trade area between Ukraine 
and the EU.27 
Responding to the growing demand to reconsider and to enhance the different 
external policies towards the neighbour countries, the European Commission initiated - 
in 2003 - the “Wider Europe-Neighbourhood” policy towards third countries which 
                                                
20 For the comparative overview and scrutiny of the PCAs, see R. Petrov, ‘The Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements with the Newly Independent States’, in: A. Ott & K. Inglis (eds), European 
Enlargement Handbook, (The Hague, Asser Press, 2002), pp. 175-194. See also V. Muravyov, Pravovi 
zasady regulyvania ekonomichikh vidnosyn Evropeiskogo Souzy z tretimy krainamy (teoria I praktika) 
(Kiev, Akadem Press 2002). 
21 Articles 13, 14 and 15 TEU. European Council Common Strategy towards Russia (O.J. 1999 L157/1). 
European Council Common Strategy towards Ukraine (O.J. 1999 L331/1). For more information on the 
procedure of adoption of the CSs and the historical background, see C. Hillion, ‘Institutional Aspects of 
the Partnership Between the European Union and the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet 
Union: Case Studies of Russia and Ukraine’, (2000) 37 CML Rev., pp. 1211-1235. Pursuant to Article 13 
of the TEU the European Council may ‘decide on common strategies to be implemented by the Union in 
areas where the Member States have important interests in common’. The CSs are implemented via the 
application of common actions and common positions. 
22 The European Council meeting in Cologne in June 1999 adopted the CS towards Russia. See point 78, 
Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council (O.J. 1999 L157/1). The CS towards Russia is 
terminated. 
23 The CS towards Ukraine was adopted at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999. See point 
56, Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council (O.J. 1999 L331/1). The CSs were adopted for 
duration of four years with the possibility of being prolonged, reviewed and if necessary adapted by the 
European Council. 
24 CS of 19 June 2000 on the Mediterranean region (O.J. 2000 L183/5). 
25 Article 6 of the CS towards Ukraine. 
26 It is stressed in Article 20 of the CS towards Ukraine that approximation should take place in such areas 
as: competition policy, standards and certification, intellectual property rights, data protection, customs 
procedures and environment. 
27 Article 61 of the CS towards Ukraine. 
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share an immediate post-enlargement border with the EU.28 The ENP was launched as 
an “umbrella” policy with a strong degree of differentiation, covering a “ring of 
[immediate] neighbours”, which included the Southern Mediterranean countries 
(Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and the Palestinian 
Authority) and “Western” PCA countries (Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova). From the 
very beginning, the ENP has proven itself to be a dynamic EU external policy without 
clear geographical limits. Due to the extremely important energy and security value of 
the Caucasus region, the ENP has been expanded to Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan,29 
while two major immediate EU neighbours, the Russian Federation and Belarus, are 
currently excluded from the scope of the ENP.30 
The underlying ENP objective is to open up certain sectors of the European 
Internal Market for the neighbour countries and to enhance political dialogue between 
the parties in return for substantive political, economic, and legal reforms and the 
implementation of shared or common values.31 The objectives of the ENP are to be met 
through the implementation of a set of priorities in tailor-made jointly-agreed Action 
Plans within the key areas of political dialogue, economic reform, trade, and co-
operation on justice and home affairs. All Action Plans emphasise the need for the 
neighbour countries to adhere to shared common values as a pre-condition for further 
enhancement of bilateral relations with the EU. The Action Plans illustrate in greater 
detail the way ahead over the next three to five years. The next stage of the ENP offers 
new enhanced co-operation in the form of European Neighbourhood Agreements to 
replace the present generation of bilateral agreements when the Action Plan priorities 
are met. 
Quite crucially, the ENP does not offer a substantively new institutional 
framework for effective bilateral co-operation between the EU and the neighbour 
countries. Instead, the ENP is based upon already existing contractual relations between 
the parties (Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAAs) and PCAs). 
Institutional arrangements within the EMAAs and PCAs are not of equal value. EMAAs 
(concluded with all the countries of the Barcelona Process32 with the current exception 
of Syria) envisage the functioning of the Association Council and the Association 
Committee, which are authorised to issue binding-decisions pertaining to the 
functioning of the agreement. The institutional framework of the PCAs comprise the 
Co-operation Council and Parliamentary Committee, which can only issue non-binding 
recommendations. Therefore, while decisions adopted by the EMAAs Association 
                                                
28 Сommunication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament ‘Wider Europe – 
Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’ 
(COM(2003) 104 final). 
29 ENP Action Plans with Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan were signed on 14 November 2006. 
30 The Russian Federation has opted for a strategic partnership with the EU through the four common 
spaces initiative. Defined at the St. Petersburg Summit in May 2003 as four ‘common spaces’: a common 
economic space; a common space of freedom, security and justice; a space of co-operation in the field of 
external security; as well as a space of research and education, including cultural aspects. At the Moscow 
Summit in May 2005, the EU and Russia adopted a single package of Road Maps directed at the practical 
realisation of the common spaces project. Belarus, while being a formal participant of the ENP, is not yet 
part of the ENP due to the prolonged political isolation of the “authoritarian and anti-democratic” 
Lukashenko regime put in place by the EU and other European organisations. 
31 The terms “common” and “shared” values in the ENP documents are applied interchangeably and thus 
may be considered to be synonymous. 
32 Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and the Palestinian Authority. 
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Councils may constitute part of the EC legal order,33 recommendations issued by the 
Co-operation Councils of the PCAs do not. Furthermore, neither EMAAs nor PCAs 
provide an informal level of consultations between the EU and the neighbour countries’ 
experts, in contrast to those envisaged with the EU’s other neighbours, who benefit 
from more developed relationships under the EEA Agreement,34 from the European 
Communities-Swiss sectoral agreements and from the decisions adopted within the 
framework of the European Communities-Turkey Customs Union.35 
“Joint ownership” forms one of the key characteristics of the ENP: the idea is 
that the parties elaborate the framework of their co-operation through jointly-agreed 
Action Plans.36 It is argued here that the ENP belongs to a new generation of EU 
external policies which, despite their rhetorical reference to “shared values”, in actual 
fact pursue the objective of promoting and protecting the EU’s own values. In fact, 
neither the EU development agreements (Cotonou), nor the Barcelona Declaration, nor 
the partnership and co-operation agreements acknowledge the objective of exporting the 
EU’s common values so explicitly. In the context of the ENP, the EU institutions 
acknowledge that common or shared values should be understood as the “the EU’s 
fundamental values and objectives”.37 In other words, common values in the context of 
the ENP do not, in practice, mean jointly shared values between the neighbour country 
and the EU Member States, but rather that the EU’s own fundamental values and 
objectives, enshrined in the EU founding treaties and reflected in the ENP Strategy 
Paper, should be adopted by the neighbour countries.38 
The notion of common values in the ENP is, in fact, underpinned by strong 
conditionality. It is explicitly stated that “the level of ambition of the EU’s relationships 
with its neighbours will take into account the extent to which these values [emphasis 
added] are effectively shared”.39 Any progress in relations between the EU and a 
neighbour country is conditional on the “degree of commitment to common values, as 
well as […the] will and capacity [of the neighbour country] to implement agreed 
priorities”. Conditionality is visible through country reports and monitoring procedures 
directed at the way in which the ENP countries implement the “EU fundamental 
values”. The country reports, modelled on the accession country reports, enable the 
Commission to scrutinise the progress made by the neighbour countries in achieving the 
objectives of their individual Action Plans.40 During the comparatively short history of 
the ENP, these reports testify to the fact that the neighbour countries have achieved 
                                                
33 For example, Case 12/86 Meryem Demirel v Stadt Schwabisch Gmund, [1987] ECR 3719. 
34 Art 99(1) EEA Agreement provides: ‘[the Commission] shall informally (emphasis added) seek advice 
from the EFTA experts in the same way as it seeks advice from the EC Member States for the elaboration 
of its proposals’. 
35 See eg Decision 1/95 EC-Turkey Association Council (O.J. 1996 L 35/1), Decision 1/96 EC-Turkey 
Customs Cooperation Committee (O.J. 1996 L 200/14), and Decision 2/97 EC-Turkey Association 
Council (O.J. 1997 L 191/1). 
36 European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper (COM(2004) 373 final) 8. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Сommunication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament ‘Wider Europe – 
Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’. 
(COM(2003) 104 final) 5. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament ‘On Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy: Overall 
Assessment’ (COM(2006) 726 final). 
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considerable success in implementing the EU’s common values.41 There is little doubt 
that the application of the conditionality policy has played a fairly important role in 
achieving these results. Nevertheless, the Commission has also been eager to highlight 
areas in which the neighbour countries are required to accelerate the pace of their 
reforms.42 
It must be admitted that the ENP provides an excellent playing-field for the 
promotion of the EU’s common values to third countries. Several factors favour such a 
proposition. First and foremost, despite the publicly proclaimed joint-ownership of the 
ENP by the EU and the neighbour countries, the ENP remains a policy of an 
asymmetrical nature which imposes unequal mutual commitments on both parties. 
Unlike the previous enlargement process of the EU eastwards, the ENP does not 
envisage the possibility of full or even associate EU membership for neighbour 
countries in return for their fulfilling the objectives of the ENP and adopting the EU’s 
common values. Nevertheless, the neighbour countries are required to implement a 
significant portion of the acquis communautaire and to launch ambitious political, legal 
and economic reforms under a “pre-accession” type of monitoring process carried out 
by EU institutions. In other words, the ENP offers the neighbour countries several 
relatively undefined “carrots”: a stake in the EC internal market, an upgrade in political 
co-operation, and the provision for additional financial assistance through the new 
Neighbourhood Financial Instrument. Furthermore, the ENP, as it is promoted by the 
EU, is an external policy of a temporary nature. The neighbourhood countries that 
successfully adopt the EU’s common values are promised the opportunity to access an 
enhanced (though yet undefined) level of relations, the provision of a new enhanced 
agreement, a free-trade area, and a visa facilitation regime. 
 
Association agreement versus partnership agreement. What is the difference? 
Before discussing whether a future EU-Ukraine agreement could be concluded on 
another legal base than that of Article 310 EC, it would be rational to clarify the 
meaning of “an association” and “a partnership” under EU law. It appears that neither 
EU legal sources nor academics can provide clear answers to this issue. Article 310 EC 
states that: “The Community may conclude with one or more States or international 
organisations agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and 
obligations, common action and special procedure.” One of the few explicit guidelines 
on the scope of association in EU external relations comes from the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) in its Demirel judgment, wherein it is stated that an association agreement 
implies: “creating special privileged links with a non-member country which must, at 
                                                
41 For instance, in the case of Ukraine the Commission acknowledged that parliamentary elections in 
March 2006 and September 2007 had been conducted in free and democratic manner, and considerable 
progress had been made towards consolidating respect for human rights and the rule of law. The 
Commission praised Ukrainian, Moldovan, and Jordan achievements in the fight against corruption and 
judiciary reform and progress in economic and social reforms in Tunisia. The Morocco Country Report 
stated that Morocco has implemented important reforms in most of the main areas of the Action Plan 
(liberalisation of the audiovisual sector, lifting reservations to some human rights international 
conventions, financial sector, transport, and environment). 
42 In the case of Moldova, “the implementation of reforms needs to be given greater attention, including 
areas which have shown good legislative progress”. In the case of Tunisia, the Commission underlined 
“slow progress on freedom of association and expression and on implementing the programme for 
modernising the justice system”. 
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least to a certain extent, take part in the Community system.”43 However, in the opinion 
of S. Peers,44 not all association agreements based upon Article 310 EC contain 
reciprocal rights and obligations and offer third countries participation in the EC 
system. Reciprocal obligations in the EU association agreements can be set aside for 
various political reasons. He argues that “a particular association agreement might even 
contain fewer integration obligations than a partnership or co-operation agreement”.45 
This view can be explained by the fact that, initially, the use of Article 310 EC (ex 238 
European Economic Community Treaty (EEC)) was considered only as an alternative to 
the use of Article 133 EC (ex 113 EEC) as a basis for external agreements between the 
European Economic Community and third countries. In the early years of European 
integration, there was some uncertainty over alternative legal bases for external 
agreements between the European Economic Community and third countries which 
went beyond trade relations. Only after some time had elapsed was Article 308 EC used 
alongside Article 133 EC, and its implied powers were invented later, too. 
In the past two decades, the European Communities have concluded quite a few 
association agreements on the basis of Article 310 EC, with far-reaching integration 
objectives which might lead to eventual EU membership (EAs with CEE countries, 
SAAs with the Western Balkan countries). These agreements contain specific reciprocal 
obligations in line with requirement of the Demirel judgement. For example, they 
include the EU commitment to ensure access of third country nationals to its Internal 
Market and to provide financial assistance for certain political and legal reforms. In 
return, third countries accept specific obligations such as the voluntary harmonisation of 
national legislation with that of the EU and the implementation of specified 
international conventions. Article 310 EC will not disappear after the possible entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon. It will be transferred without changes to Title V 
“International Agreements” as Article 217 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU 
(the new title will replace the title of the EC Treaty). Thus, it is likely that the EU will 
continue to conclude association agreements with third countries in order to pursue the 
specific objectives of the external EU policies, which range from preparing a third 
country for EU membership to the enhancement of bilateral political and economic 
relations. 
The meaning of a “partnership” under EU law is not clear, either. In the 
meantime, partnership agreements can be concluded on the basis of Article 181a EC, 
which was added to the EC Treaty by the Treaty of Nice. The objective of Article 181a 
EC is to provide a legal basis for the European Communities to carry out “economic, 
financial and technical co-operation measures [emphasis added] with third countries…. 
[which] shall contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating 
democracy and the rule of law, and to the objective of respecting human rights and 
fundamental freedoms”. In theory, Article 181a EC could be used as a legal basis by the 
EU institutions for the issuing of legal acts relating to the exercise of the external EC 
policies other than those of accession, association and development. However, in 
                                                
43 Case 12/86 Meryem Demirel v Stadt Schwabisch Gmund [1987] ECR 3719 at para. 7. 
44 S. Peers, ‘EC frameworks of international relations: co-operation, partnership, association’ in: A. 
Dashwood & C. Hillion (eds), The General Law of EC External Relations, (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 
2000) pp. 160-178. at 175. 
45 Ibid, at p. 175. Here, S. Peers refer to the earlier association agreements with Mediterranean countries 
which were called “co-operation agreements”. The co-operation agreement with Syria is still in force. 
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practice, Article 181a EC does not explicitly exclude the possibility of co-operation 
measures covering associated and developing countries. The application of this article 
by the EU institutions is not frequent. For instance, Article 181a EC is mainly used as a 
legal basis to issue a variety of legal acts relating to the functioning of the PCAs 
(changes in the scope of the application of the PCAs caused by the accession of new 
Member States to the EU, and the provision of financial and technical assistance to 
neighbour countries).46 Furthermore, Article 181a EC is characterised by some degree of 
procedural flexibility. In contrast to the procedure envisaged in Articles 308 and 310 
EC, the co-operation measures adopted under Article 181a EC do not require unanimity 
in the Council. Article 181a EC provides that the Council - acting by a qualified-
majority on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European 
Parliament - can adopt legal acts. The Treaty of Lisbon does not repeal Article 181a EC 
as a whole, but considerably modifies it. If the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force, 
Article 181a EC will be renamed as Article 212 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
EU (TFEU). The new version of Article 181a EC makes several important changes to 
its content, which removes the ambiguities inherent to its recent version. For instance, 
these changes explicitly distance new Article 212 TFEU from the EU development 
policy, thereby aiming this legal basis for the EU’s acts in the field of external relations 
with third countries other than association countries and developing countries. First, 
Article 212 TFEU explicitly states that the co-operation measures can cover only third 
countries other than developing countries. Second, it clarifies that economic, financial 
and technical co-operation measures include financial assistance to third countries. 
Third, Article 212 TFEU emphasises that the co-operation measures should be coherent 
with the foundations of the external EU action (the EU’s development policy and 
principles and objectives of the external EU action). Fourth, the co-operation measures 
to be issued under Article 212 TFEU are to be adopted in accordance with the co-
decision procedure between the Council and the European Parliament (ordinary 
legislative procedure in the Lisbon Treaty). Thus, the revised Article 212 TFEU will 
serve as a legal basis for the EU external agreements and legal acts relating to the 
partnership and co-operation between the EU and third countries, possibly including 
neighbouring countries, but definitely excluding association and development 
agreements. 
It is still not clear how the new Article 212 TFEU will be used by the EU 
institutions after the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force. In fact, the EU will obtain a new 
legal basis to conclude external agreements with neighbour countries. The Treaty of 
Lisbon will add a new Article 8 to the TEU, which will provide it with a legal basis to 
“conclude specific agreements with the [neighbour countries]. These agreements may 
contain reciprocal rights and obligations as well as the possibility of undertaking 
activities jointly”. Thus, on the one hand, it is quite possible that Article 212 TFEU will 
serve as a legal basis for partnership agreements with third countries which cannot be 
considered as geographical/political neighbours of the EU. On the other, it is quite 
possible that both new Article 8 TEU and Article 212 TFEU may be used as a legal 
basis for future agreements with neighbouring countries. 
                                                
46 For example, Council and Commission Decision 2007/681/EC, Euroatom concerning the conclusion of 
the Protocol to the PCA with Moldova on accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU 
(O.J. 2007 L281/23). Regulation 1638/2006 laying down general provisions establishing a European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (O.J. 2006 C321/127). 
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In the course of negotiating new partnership agreements with the EU, third 
countries may express concern that Article 181a EC does not envisage partnership 
agreements containing special privileged links and reciprocal rights as in the association 
agreements concluded under Article 310 EC. However, there are, in fact, EU external 
agreements other than association agreements, which are characterised by a deep level 
of integration reminiscent of association agreements. For instance, in the Simutenkov 
case,47 the ECJ drew a parallel between the EU-Russia PCA and the EU-Slovakia 
association agreement, with regard to the recognition of the PCA provisions as having 
direct effect on the EU legal order. In this case, the ECJ stated that the different 
objectives of the EU-Slovakia Association Agreement and the EU-Russia PCA did not 
preclude either direct effect or a similar interpretation (the same as that given to the EC 
Treaty itself) of the non-discrimination provision of the PCA. It could be argued that the 
logic behind the argumentation of the ECJ in the Simutenkov case implies that deeper 
integration (non-discrimination rules, access to the EC Internal Market freedoms) may 
be part not only of association agreements concluded on the basis of Article 310 EC, but 
also of partnership agreements concluded on the basis of Article 181a EC. Therefore, 
theoretically, one may argue that the future EU-Ukraine enhanced partnership 
agreement, which envisages elements of deep economic, political and legal integration, 
can be distinguished from the enhanced objectives which are typical of the EU 
association agreements (close political and economic co-operation, the establishment of 
a free-trade area, and far-reaching approximation of Ukrainian legislation to that of the 
EU). 
 
Can the Ukrainian objectives achieved by other means than that of an association 
agreement? 
In the light of accepting the hypothetical possibility of a new EU-Ukraine enhanced 
agreement being negotiated on a legal basis other than that of an association agreement, 
we propose to scrutinise whether the objectives of the EU-Ukraine relations within the 
framework of the ENP and, consequently, the objectives of the new EU-Ukraine 
enhanced agreement, could be met by another form of an agreement than that of an 
association agreement? We suggest starting from the analysis of the contemporary 
objectives of the Ukrainian policy towards the EU, which are highlighted by the 
Verkhovna Rada in its statement issued on 22 February 2007 concerning the launching 
of the negotiations on the new fundamental agreement between the EU and Ukraine.48 
The first and most desired objective of the Ukrainian policy towards the EU is to 
sign an agreement which envisages at least the potential membership of Ukraine in the 
EU in the medium- to long-term perspective in line with conditions articulated in 
Article 49 TEU. In the opinion of the Ukrainian political élite, such an agreement 
should resemble either the EAs with the CEE countries, or the SAAs with the Western 
Balkan countries. In the event of the signing of such an agreement, Ukraine would be 
ready to abide by a strong conditionality policy and actively participate in the cross-
pillar co-operation with the EU in return for the remote prospect of full EU-
                                                
47 Case C-265/03 Simutenkov v Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, Real Federación Española de Fútbol 
[2005] ECR I-2579. 
48 Supra note 7. 
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membership. However, neither the recent statements of the top EU politicians49 (apart 
from several Resolutions of the European Parliament), nor the objectives of the ENP, 
which are “distinct from the possibilities available to European countries under Article 
49 of the Treaty on European Union”, envisage even the remote prospect of EU 
membership for Ukraine.50 
Clearly, one should admit that, while being distinct from the issue of the EU 
membership, the ENP “does not prejudge any possible future developments of partner 
countries’ relationship with the EU”.51 However, any possible future developments of 
the neighbour countries’ relations with the EU may not necessary mean full EU-
membership, but may mean either an association or close sectoral co-operation with the 
EU. Furthermore, even in the event that some neighbour countries are given a “green 
light” to launch the accession negotiations, their relations will no longer be governed by 
the ENP, but will be transferred to the fully-fledged accession process adopted in the 
course of the 2005 and 2007 accessions. For example, the Western Balkan countries 
which share an immediate border with the EU were omitted from the ENP from the very 
initial stage of this initiative. Instead, these countries embarked upon an accession-
directed policy as “potential candidates” even before some of them had been recognised 
as “candidate countries”. In this case, in addition to the new enhanced framework 
agreement, intermediate relations between a candidate country and the EU will be 
governed by the Accession Partnership, issued by the Council through qualified-
majority voting following a proposal from the Commission.52 Thereafter, based upon the 
Accession Partnership and annual Commission Regular Reports on the progress towards 
accession, and in line with positive latest accession experience, every candidate country 
will issue a National Programme for Adoption of the Acquis, which sets up a detailed 
adaptation action plan in accordance with national specifics. 
Therefore, in our opinion, even in the event that the EU signs an association 
agreement with Ukraine, this agreement will not contain the long cherished membership 
objective and will not resemble either EAs or SAAs, but will be similar to the 
association agreements that the EU concluded with the other neighbour countries 
participating in the Barcelona Process.53 In other words, the limited objectives of the 
ENP do not automatically imply the prospect of EU membership for Ukraine in the 
event of an association agreement being concluded between the EU and Ukraine. 
The second objective of the Ukrainian policy towards the EU is to achieve deep 
economic integration with the EU through the setting up of a free-trade area and through 
gaining better access to the European Internal Market for Ukrainian nationals and 
undertakings. Even acknowledging that an association agreement is the most 
appropriate contractual framework to achieve these objectives, we may still look for 
                                                
49 The Commissioner in External Relations and ENP Benita Ferrero-Waldner stated on 14 June that the 
issue of the EU membership for Ukraine could be discussed, but only in the distant future. See at: 
www.liga.kiev.ua, 20 April 2008. 
50 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, ‘European 
Neighbourhood Policy – Strategy Paper’, COM(2004) 373. 
51 General Affairs and External Relations 2809 Council meeting on 18 June 2007, 1065/07 (Presse 138), 
at p. 9. 
52 Regulation 622/98 (O.J. L 85, 1998). 
53 It is named after Barcelona Declaration, which was adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference on 
27-28 November 1995. For a comprehensive account of the Barcelona Declaration, see F. Hakura, ‘The 
Euro-Med Policy: The Implications of the Barcelona Declaration’, (1997) 34 CML Rev, pp. 337-366. 
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other options already devised by the external EU policy. The overview of the external 
EU agreements displays various agreements which have pursued far-reaching economic 
integration objectives without being concluded under Article 310 EC. Good examples 
include the prior accession Agreements for the formation of a free-trade area between 
the European Economic Community and Portugal54 (which entered in force on 1 January 
1973) and Spain55 (which entered in force on 1 October 1970). These agreements were 
based upon Articles 113, 114 and 228 EEC, and omitted any references to the 
association between the European Economic Community and these countries. The 
objective of setting up a free-trade area could be achieved through a development 
agreement. For example, the EU-Mexico Economic Partnership, Political Co-ordination 
and Co-operation Agreement known as a “Global Agreement”, which was signed on 8 
December 1997 in Brussels and entered into force on 1 October 2000,56 was concluded 
upon the basis of Article 133 EC and envisaged the objective of establishing a free-trade 
area. The Global Agreement pursues three major objectives: political dialogue; the 
reinforcement of bilateral co-operation; and the liberalisation of trade and services 
between the parties. The Global Agreement is based upon Articles 44(2), 47, 55, 57(2), 
71, 80(2), and 133 EC in conjunction with the second sentence of Article 300(2) EC and 
the second subparagraph of Article 300(3) EC.57 The Global Agreement sets out the 
target of establishing the European Communities-Mexico free-trade area in goods and 
services, with the subsequent opening of national procurement, capital and financial 
markets. Moreover, it emphasises the adherence of the parties to a regime of fair 
competition and to internationally recognised standards of intellectual property rights.58 
In addition to its strong economic dimension, the Global Agreement is characterised by 
its democratic/human rights and political dimensions. The Preamble of the Global 
Agreement underlines the parties’ “full commitment” to democratic principles and 
fundamental human rights, to principles of the international rule of law and to good 
governance.59 The objective of the free-trade area between Mexico and the EU was 
achieved through the decision of the EU-Mexico Joint Council, which is empowered to 
issue binding-decisions. Similar to the Global Agreement, the future enhanced EU-
Ukraine agreement may be an agreement with “special institutional arrangements”. This 
means that common institutions could be vested with powers to issue binding decisions 
which enable the establishment of a free-trade area between the parties. Therefore, the 
objective of establishing a free-trade area between the EU and Ukraine could be 
achieved not exclusively through an association agreement, but also through another 
agreement concluded in line with other legal bases than that of Article 310 EC. Even if 
such an agreement does not itself establish a free-trade area, it must envisage a 
competence of common institutions to issue binding decisions which would enable the 
creation of a free-trade area. 
                                                
54 O.J. 1972 L301. 
55 O.J. 1970 L182. 
56 O.J. 2000 L276. F 
57 It requires “other agreements establishing a specific institutional framework by organising co-operation 
procedures, agreements having important budgetary implications for the Community and agreements 
entailing amendment of an act adopted under the procedure referred to in Article 251 shall be concluded 
after the assent of the European Parliament has been obtained”. 
58 Article 12 of the EC-Mexico TDCA. 
59 The Preamble to the Global Agreement refer to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN 
Charter; 1994 San Paulo EU Ministerial Declaration. 
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The third objective of the new EU-Ukraine enhanced agreement desired by the 
Verkhovna Rada is to ensure the direct effect of the provisions of this agreement in the 
EU legal order, and, consequently, to envisage the access of Ukrainian undertakings and 
nationals to the European Internal Market freedoms. In this case, it could be argued that 
the contractual format of the EU-Ukraine co-operation within the framework of the 
PCA is not exhausted yet. As we know from the ECJ decision in the Simutenkov case,60 
the nature and objectives of the EU-Russia PCA did not hamper the direct effect of its 
provisions in the EU legal order. In the opinion of the ECJ, the principle of non-
discrimination in Article 23 (1) of the EU-Russia PCA has direct effect in the EU legal 
order. The ECJ explicitly stated that “the fact that [PCA] is thus limited to establishing a 
partnership between the parties, without providing for an association or future accession 
of the Russian Federation to the Communities, is not such as to prevent certain of its 
provisions from having direct effect”.61 In the Simutenkov case, the ECJ acknowledged 
the direct effect only of the provisions of the EU-Russia PCA. There were no rulings by 
the ECJ on recognising the provisions of the EU-Ukraine PCA as having direct effect. 
However, one may argue that some provisions of the EU-Ukraine PCA are capable of 
having direct effect because they are sufficiently clear and precise to be directly 
effective, and are not subject, in terms of implementation and effect, to the adoption of 
any subsequent measures.62. For instance, these include provisions on most favoured 
nation treatment of companies and the rights of a “key personnel” or “intra-corporate 
transferees”, and regarding the movement of capital.63 
Even if the ECJ does not recognise the direct effect of provisions of the EU-
Ukraine PCA, the provisions of the future EU-Ukraine “enhanced” partnership 
agreement should have direct effect in the EU legal order in two cases. First, it is 
possible if these provisions are modelled on the equivalent provisions of the EU-Russia 
PCA which have already been recognised by the ECJ - in the Simutenkov case - as 
having direct effect. Second, the objectives of the future EU-Ukraine “enhanced” 
partnership agreement are likely to be identical to the objectives of the EU association 
agreements with third countries. With regard to this argument, the ECJ has compared 
the objectives of the Russia PCA and the Slovakia EA, and stated that the objective of 
the PCA to bring about “the gradual integration between Russia and a wider area of co-
operation in Europe” does not preclude the direct effect of its provisions on the EU legal 
order. Therefore, one can argue that the access of the neighbour countries’ nationals and 
undertakings and the possibility for them to rely on the directly effective provisions of 
future enhanced agreements depends on the objectives of the future agreement, and the 
substance and scope of its provisions. Consequently, from the legal point of view, the 
new partnership agreement may go further than recent PCAs and offer better access for 
Ukrainian undertakings and nationals to the European Internal Market through the 
                                                
60 Supra note 47. 
61 It is clear from the ECJ case law that when an agreement establishes co-operation between the parties, 
some of the provisions of that agreement may, under the conditions set out in paragraph 21 of the present 
judgement, directly govern the legal position of individuals (Kziber C-18/90 [1991] ECR I-199 paragraph 
21, Case C-113/97 Babahenini [1998] paragraph 17, ECR I-183, and Case C-162/96 Racke [1998] ECR I-
3655, paragraphs 34 to 36). 
62 For more about direct effect of the PCAs provisions, see R. Petrov, “Rights of third country/NIS 
nationals to pursue economic activity in the EC”, (1999) 4 EFA Rev., pp. 235-253. 
63 See, by the same author, “The Partnership and Co-operation Agreements with the Newly Independent 
States”, in: A. Ott & K. Inglis (eds) European Enlargement Handbook (The Hague, Asser Press, 2002), 
pp. 175-194. 
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partial right of movement, the national regime for the establishment of Ukrainian 
undertakings in the EU, the principle of non-discrimination, etc. Clearly, the relevant 
provisions of a new enhanced EU-Ukraine agreement should be clear and precise in 
order to be considered as having direct effect as already indicated in the ECJ case law. 
The fourth objective of the Ukrainian policy towards the EU is to sign a 
“transitional” agreement which could lead to a higher degree of co-operation with a 
short- to medium-term expiry deadline. To meet this objective, the Ukrainian side 
proposes to sign an association agreement with the prospect of the full EU-membership. 
Taking the objections and concerns raised above into consideration, it is unlikely that 
the EU will include any reference to EU membership in the text of the agreement. 
However, both an association and a new partnership agreement may contain references 
to the transitional nature of these agreements. In fact, it could be argued that, as a matter 
of general practice, association agreements which do not envisage EU membership for 
an associated country are less “transitional” in their nature and tend to establish a long-
term format of relations between the EU and a third country (for example, association 
agreements between the EU and countries of African (South Africa), Asian (South 
Korea) and South American (Chile) regions). 
 
Does Russia matter? 
In conclusion, let us try to generalise and look at the potential scope and legal basis of 
the new EU-Ukraine enhanced agreement through the prism of some political and legal 
factors. In other words, let us try to answer the question: “Is the recent political 
environment favourable to the conclusion of a new enhanced agreement between the EU 
and Ukraine based upon Article 310 EC? To answer this question, several political 
factors should be taken into consideration. The first factor is the fact that the EU 
institutions consider the ENP as a long-running policy in relations with neighbour 
countries and an alternative to the full EU-membership. The Treaty of Lisbon transfers 
Article I-57(2) of the Draft EU Constitutional Treaty to the TEU as new Article 8(2), 
which states that the “Union may conclude specific agreements with the countries 
concerned [neighbouring countries]. These agreements may contain reciprocal rights 
and obligations as well as the possibility of undertaking activities jointly. Their 
implementation shall be the subject of periodic consultation.” This means that new 
enhanced agreements resulting from the ENP relations will constitute a separate group 
of EU external agreements which are distinguished by “reciprocal rights and 
obligations” similar to that which is mentioned in Article 310 EC. New Article 8(1) 
TEU emphasises that “The Union shall develop special relationships with neighbouring 
countries”. This provision is very much in line with the famous Demirel judgment, 
although it does not envisages a neighbour country participation in the EU system. The 
Treaty of Lisbon considers association and neighbourhood agreements as agreements 
concluded on separate legal bases.64 While the signing and subsequent ratification of the 
Treaty of Lisbon is in the pipeline, the EU is in position to apply temporary solutions in 
order to offer to the neighbour countries a type of contractual relationship which is not 
                                                
64 Article 217 of Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union will provide “The Union may conclude 
an association agreement with one or more third countries or international organisations in order to 
establish an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common actions and special 
procedures”. 
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in contradiction with the logic of the neighbourhood policy towards third countries. We 
should ask the question as to what will happen if the EU concludes an association 
agreement with Ukraine before the Treaty of Lisbon comes into force. Will the 
legitimacy of the entire ENP suffer? 
The second political factor is the fact that if the new EU-Ukraine enhanced 
agreement is signed as an association agreement, it might come into conflict with the 
objectives of the EU-Russia relations. Despite being outside the ENP, the Russian 
Federation remains a strategic partner of the EU. From the early 1990s, EU-Russian 
contractual relations have been the most advanced, in comparison to the other former 
USSR republics.65 For instance, the EU-Russian PCA provided better opportunities for 
Russian undertakings and nationals to access the EC Internal Market. It contains hard 
commitments on behalf of the EU to ensure non-discriminatory treatment of legally-
established Russian workers in the EU.66 Furthermore, the EU-Russian PCA envisages 
the freedom of temporary movement of Russian nationals in the EU, albeit within a 
visibly limited scope.67 Apparently, the provisions on the supply of services in the EU-
Russian PCA are almost identical to the related provisions in the EAs and SAAs.68 One 
of the possibilities that accounts for why Russia refused to participate in the ENP was 
that it was seeking similar, if not more favourable, arrangements with the EU than other 
neighbour countries had attained, without undertaking similar commitments in the field 
of the protection of democratic freedoms and human rights. In the meantime, the major 
objective of the Russian policy towards the EU has been to develop the four-
dimensional common-spaces area with the minimum application of the EU 
conditionality policy. The EU-Russian PCA is due to expire in 2007 and negotiations on 
new enhanced agreement are due after the Commission obtains the mandate to begin 
negotiations on the new agreement with Russia, which could occur after the new 
agreement with Ukraine has been concluded. It is very likely that Russian negotiators 
will push for a new agreement which not only equals, but also exceeds the level of 
economic integration between the EU and Russia in terms of ensuring a comparable 
level of economic and political integration of Russia and the EU (the establishment of a 
free-trade area, access of Russian undertakings to the European Internal Market, non-
discriminatory treatment of Russian nationals in the EU, and security and criminal 
police co-operation). The legal basis and scope of the new EU-Russia enhanced 
agreement remains unclear. After V. Putin came to power in 2000, the Russian 
government formally ruled out any aspirations of joining the EU. Instead, the Russian 
government officially prefers to develop bilateral contractual relations with the EU in 
order to maintain “its freedom to determine and implement its domestic and foreign 
policies” towards the EU.69 The Russian Federation is interested in strategic partnership 
with the EU with purpose of “solving specific and considerable tasks which are of 
interest for both parties”.70 At the same time, the EU-Russia strategic partnership should 
pursue the task of “consolidating Russia’s role as a leading power in shaping up a new 
                                                
65 R. Petrov, ‘The Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with the Newly Independent States’, in: A. 
Ott & K. Inglis (eds) European Enlargement Handbook, (The Hague, Asser Press, 2002), pp. 175-194. 
66 Article 23 of the EU-Russia PCA. 
67 Article 37 of the EU-Russia PCA. 
68 For example, see Article 55 of the EU-Hungary EA, and Article 55 of the EU-Macedonia SAA. 
69 Article 1.1 of the Russia’s Middle Term Strategy towards the EU (2000-2010), at: 
http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/en/p_245.htm, 20 April 2008. 
70 Ibid, Article 1.2. 
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system of interstate political and economic relations in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States area”.71 
In general, there are several scenarios for the future contractual relations 
between the EU and Russia when recent political and economic complications in 
relations between them are taken into consideration: 1) to extend the force of the recent 
EU-Russia PCA; 2) to amend the recent EU-Russia PCA in order to make changes in 
the bilateral relations (WTO accession); 3) to conclude a new enhanced partnership or 
an association agreement; and 4) to conclude bilateral agreements on sectoral co-
operation similar to that which exists between the EU and Switzerland. In the opinion of 
Russian experts, any other way of development (absence of a framework co-operation 
agreement) would deteriorate EU-Russia relations and would lead to permanent trade 
and energy wars and to “consequent geopolitical confrontation between the EU and 
Russia”.72 
The Russian attitude towards the ENP is quite ambiguous. Russia does not 
welcome the EU’s attempts “to hamper the economic integration in the CIS, in 
particular, through maintaining ‘special relations’ with individual countries of the 
Commonwealth to the detriment of Russia’s interests”.73 This means that far-reaching 
contractual agreements between the EU and the neighbour countries could not be 
welcomed by Russia since these relations will definitely hinder any further integration 
within the CIS. The recent stalemate in EU-Russia relations will, sooner or later, be 
eventually solved by the signing of a new bilateral agreement between the EU and 
Russia. Both parties put high hopes on this document. Former Russian President V. 
Putin stated that “all positive results of our [EU-Russia] relations must be fixed and 
developed in new fundamental agreement on strategic partnership Russia-EU”.74 There 
are considerable hopes on the new EU-Russia agreement on the EU side as well. It 
appears that, in return for Russia’s long-term guarantees of secure energy supplies for 
Western Europe, the EU is ready to offer a free-trade area perspective for Russia. The 
European Commission President, José Manuel Barroso, publicly stated that, in the new 
EU-Russia agreement, “we are proposing [that] Member States give us a mandate for 
negotiating with Russia a comprehensive agreement that will bring a new quality to our 
relationship.” In particular, we propose to move towards a free-trade area, to be 
completed once Russia accedes to the WTO.” Whether Russia will be interested in this 
proposal remains to be seen. Taking into consideration the reluctance of Russia to enter 
into any association-relations with the EU or to comply with strong and binding 
conditionality and human rights clauses, one may predict that the future agreement is 
most likely to be an enhanced version of the PCA underpinned with the free-trade area. 
However, this attitude could be changed after the newly-elected President Dmitriy 
Medvedev comes to power in 2008. It is quite possible that the EU will not be eager to 
propose an association agreement with Ukraine at the sensitive time of the changing of 
the ruling élite in Russia in early 2008. It is most likely that the EU will take its time to 
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observe whether the new Russian government is drastically going to change its policy 
towards the EU. In this case, a new EU-Ukraine enhanced agreement concluded as an 
association agreement might contradict the realities of delicate political climate and the 
evolving nature of the strategic partnership between the EU and Russia. Whether the EU 
and the Russian Federation will allow it to take place remains to be seen. 
 
Conclusion 
To conclude, we have set out a number of considerations which lead us to believe that 
the scope and legal basis of the new EU-Ukraine enhanced agreement could differ from 
the generally-expected association agreement based upon Article 310 EC. Two 
considerations are relevant to this opinion. The first consideration is of a legal nature. 
From a legal point of view, an association agreement based upon Article 310 EC does 
not imply that Ukraine could be given a legal commitment on the part of the EU in 
order to obtain the possibility of joining the EU. Furthermore, the objectives of the EU-
Ukraine co-operation in the short-term and medium-term perspective could be achieved 
either by an association or by a partnership agreement. The second consideration is of 
political nature. On the one hand, it would be better for the EU to conclude an enhanced 
agreement which should be in line with the neighbourhood clause (Article 8) in the TEU 
amended by the Treaty of Lisbon and Article 212 TFEU, which provides better 
procedural arrangement for a third country than Article 217 TFEU (all decisions by the 
Council relating to the conclusion of the partnership agreement can be taken by a 
qualified-majority while the conclusion of the association agreement would require 
unanimity). On the other, a “privileged” association agreement between the EU and 
Ukraine might be in contradiction with the objectives of the evolving EU-Russia 
strategic partnership. 
Notwithstanding the thorny issue of the legal basis of the new enhanced 
agreement, more or less uniform consensus could relate to the objectives and the scope 
of the neighbourhood agreements, and the EU-Ukraine enhanced agreement in 
particular. The objectives of the neighbourhood agreements can be deduced from the 
general objectives of the ENP, which offers neighbouring countries the chance of 
participating in various EU activities through close co-operation in the political, 
security, economic and cultural fields. In accordance with logic of the ENP, the future 
neighbourhood agreements’ objectives will not be identical, but will differ in order to 
reflect the existing status of the relations between the EU and each neighbour country, 
its needs and capacities, as well as their common interests. The neighbourhood 
agreements will be preceded by jointly-agreed tailor-made Action Plans, which cover a 
number of key areas specific to each neighbouring country as provided by the ENP: 1) 
political dialogue; 2) economic and social development policy; 3) participation in a 
number of EU programmes (education and training, research and innovation); 4) 
sectoral co-operation; 5) market opening in accordance with the principles of the WTO 
and convergence with EU standards; and 6) Justice and Home Affairs co-operation.75 It 
is likely that neighbourhood agreements will reproduce both general and individually 
tailor-made objectives of the relevant bilateral Action Plans. Thus, the general 
objectives of the neighbourhood agreements could focus on close co-operation in 
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political, security, economic and cultural fields with the eventual access of the 
neighbour countries to the European Internal Market. The individual objectives of the 
neighbourhood agreements would reflect the various strategic priorities of the EU 
towards specific neighbour countries. It is suggested that the new EU-Ukraine enhanced 
agreement will be a partnership agreement based upon various articles of the EU 
founding treaties with cross-pillar dimensions. In our opinion, if signed before the 
Treaty of Lisbon enters into force, a new enhanced agreement between the EU and 
Ukraine will be based upon Article 133 EC (trade issues), Articles 57(2), 71, 80(2), 75 
and 84(2), 44(2) and 47(2) and 57(2) EC (access to the European Internal Market and 
mutual liberalisation), Article 181a EC. If signed after the Treaty of Lisbon enters into 
force, in addition to the above articles, new Article 8 TEU along with Articles 212 and 
218 TFEU will constitute a legal basis of the new enhanced agreement between the EU 
and Ukraine. In this case, the Council will take all the decisions relating to the 
negotiation and conclusion of the new agreement by a qualified-majority. It is not 
excluded that a new EU-Ukraine partnership agreement with a new ambitious title 
which emphasises its enhanced character will satisfy the expectations of the Ukrainian 
political élite. For example, it could be called an “enhanced neighbourhood agreement” 
or “association partnership agreement” in order to emphasise its difference from the 
PCA and in order to underline a new level of political and economic co-operation 
between the parties without any immediate prospect of full EU-membership. Echoing 
the opinion that the hierarchy of external EU agreements is governed by politics not 
law,76 we argue that the title of the future enhanced agreement between the EU and 
Ukraine will reflect the political realities of the EU policy towards Ukraine. 
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